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The realities of managing uncertainties surrounding pluvial urban flood risk:  
An ex post analysis in three European cities 
Abstract 
Inner-city pluvial flooding is characterised by major uncertainties, often making response 
problematic. We explore this in London, Lisbon and Rotterdam, through ex post document 
analysis and semi-structured interviews. Traditional uncertainty analysis generally focuses 
on quantifiable factors, needing to clarify uncertainty for engineering design, flood warnings 
and incident management.  But other uncertainties concern budgets, skills, legal issues and 
politics. There are also many relevant certainties or near-certainties, which can dominate. 
They need equal attention in understanding decision making for risk reduction. Responses to 
our cities’ flood risks – including portfolios of engineering and non-structural measures – also 
contain significant no-regret components requiring less certainty about risk. Our cities 
appear to be positioned along a learning continuum, related to flood experience and the 
consequential uncertainty reduction. However progress can be worryingly slow. Only 
experiencing actual flood events promotes accelerated action and often the certainties 
concerning resource constraints also outweigh the many uncertainties in risk assessment.   
 
Key words: Urban pluvial flooding, three cities, Europe, uncertainty, learning. 
1. Introduction: Uncertainty and risk in inner-city flooding  
 
Much pluvial flooding in inner-city areas is particularly uncertain (Takara, 2014). Its spatial 
extent is as unpredictable as the locations of the severe rainstorms that are its cause (e.g. 
Bales and Wagner, 2009). Urban ‘flash’ flooding - as a type of pluvial flooding - occurs very 
rapidly, consequent upon these rare, intense and highly localised meteorological events, 
often occurring in landscapes with steep topography (Gruntfest, 2009). Flood probability 
here is unpredictable because it is a function of those very rare events, the return periods of 
which are inherently uncertain because so few have been experienced at any one location in 
the past (Fontanazza et al., 2011). Such uncertainty can lead to difficult decision making.  
 
Compounding this uncertainty, the performance of existing urban drainage systems is 
likewise unpredictable, since they are often old or subject to blockages, giving uncertain 
hydraulic performance (Djordjević et al., 2014). The consequences of this urban flooding can 
also be unpredictable, depending on where is flooded, due to highly spatially variable 
population densities, property and economic activity and the potential for a flood to damage 
key urban infrastructure that may result in disproportionate impacts. Urban populations are very 
mobile, if not transitory, leading to less experience of flooding, and their behaviour can 
therefore be unpredictable (Douglas et al., 2010).  
 
But risk and uncertainty need differentiation. Risk is about the probability and 
consequences of something happening, such as a flood; certainty and uncertainty describe 
our state of knowledge about that happening (see also Doorn, 2014). Decision makers in 
urban areas are often uncertain as to future pluvial flood risk, and uncertain as to what 
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strategy to pursue to manage this uncertain risk, which is widespread (e.g. Brandolini et al., 
2012). Increased risk in the future may also arise as a consequence of climate change, 
changes in demographics leading to even larger cities, and accelerating urban economic 
activity (Beniston et al., 2007). 
 
This paper explores the uncertainties and parallel certainties and near-certainties that are 
faced by urban managers, using three case studies in different European countries. We aim 
to see though ex post analysis which uncertainties can dominate and how they may or may 
not affect perceived solutions to the urban flooding these managers experience and the 
actual decisions that they may make. 
 
2. Uncertainty in Flood Risk Management (FRM) 
 
Uncertainty can be of epistemic origin (uncertainty as a function of a lack of knowledge), or 
aleatory (uncertainty in “nature”) (Beven and Alcock, 2012). Only epistemic uncertainty can 
be reduced, but a decision maker has to contend with both.  
 
In the field of FRM, six types of uncertainty are important: 
(i) in the assessment of current and future flood risk, including its probability and 
consequences; 
(ii) in the construction of science driven modelling and thereby the provision of 
information for decision making; 
(iii) in the performance of existing and future measures for reducing flood risk, including 
peoples’ response to measures a such as warnings;  
(iv) regarding the type of decisions (e.g. adaptive, risk-based, robust decision making, 
etc.); 
(v) in the communication of uncertainties in FRM and their understanding; 
(vi) in the monitoring of risk and risk reduction, going forward. 
 
In this context the choice of risk reducing measures is riddled with uncertainties (Beven and 
Hall, 2014; McCarthy et al, 2007). As a result, a range of uncertainty analysis methods and 
decision making suggestions has developed, both in this field and more broadly (e.g. 
Dittrich, 2016). These are intended to help decision makers “by identifying the most 
influential source of uncertainty, and the implications of (this) uncertainty for the 
preference ordering between options” (Beven and Hall, 2014, 19). Decisions often need to 
be made based on model results concerning future risks that come with significant 
uncertainty (Downton et al., 2005); this modelling is necessary because of the dearth of data 
showing the impacts of past events with which to assess future flooding characteristics.  
But attention in this type of uncertainty analysis has tended to focus on those uncertainties 
susceptible to modelling, and based usually on past experience rather than complete lack of 
knowledge, promoting the use of sensitivity analysis and similar techniques “to understand 
the contribution that different factors make to total uncertainty” (Beven and Hall, 2014, 19). 
Such uncertainty analysis (Hall and Solomatine, 2008), which in general we support, 
therefore has a strong focus on what can be quantified and therefore modelled (Figure 1) 
and on whether different mitigation options should come into play as a result of different 
model results (Merz et al., 2008). Peace of mind for the decision maker is maximised if the 
results from this modelling approach to uncertainty analysis have little or no effect on the 
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ranking of the different options that are available and feasible for risk reduction: the 
uncertainty does not affect the decision to be made. 
 
But to the decision maker there may be many sound reasons not to follow such model 
results, particularly when uncertainties may crucially affect the decision to be made. As Downton 
et al. (2005) were aware, other uncertainties and constraints may dominate decision 
making, including issues such as the availability of funding, the skills of the personnel 
available to implement their plans, the performance of their mix of existing risk reducing 
measures, and the receptiveness of the public to the measures suggested.  If these 
uncertainties are outweighed by the certainties or near-certainties in any given situation, 
and the likely impact of the uncertainties is not too problematic, then perhaps decision 
making may become relatively straightforward.  
3. Research approaches and methodology 
 
Decision making under conditions of uncertainty can be approached with ex ante analysis, 
aiming to prevent poor decisions being made, and the field has been extensively reviewed 
and many methodologies proposed (e.g. Walker et al., 2013;  Beven, 2014; Kwakkel et al., 
2016; Dittrich et al., 2016). In contrast, ex post analysis, which has been less explored, looks 
at decisions that have already been made under conditions of uncertainty. Ex ante analysis 
answers questions such as what decisions can be made under uncertainty, with which 
degree of uncertainty, and how can we minimise that uncertainty. Ex post analysis seeks to 
answer different questions such as what decisions have been made under conditions of 
uncertainty, and how has that uncertainty affected this decision making. Results from ex 
post analysis should feed back into ex ante analysis to make a more complete presentation 
of the uncertainties that are factors in such decision making.  As researched here, our ex 
post analysis aims in this way to gain insight from the past with which to help guide 
decisions now and in the future.  
 
We acknowledge here the intellectual context of our work. We recognise the importance of 
theory-driven analysis of how actors engage with their own lack of knowledge (e.g. Gross 
and McGoey, 2015). However, we have found three rather more empirical approaches to 
describing and tackling decision making under conditions of uncertainty to be of greater 
value here. Thus Arentsen et al. (2000) advocate science, incrementalism and 
openness/learning.  Raadgever et al. (2011) emphasise ignoring uncertainty, knowledge 
generation, interaction and coping. Kasperson (2008) promotes a strategy of delay to gather 
further information, targeting critical uncertainties for priority analysis, enlarging the 
knowledge base through lateral thinking, invoking the precautionary principle, using an 
adaptive management approach, and building a resilient society (White, 2008).  
 
From these ideas we developed a simple analytical framework to better categorise and 
thereby better understand the role that uncertainty can play in decisions about flood 
problems (Figure 2). This framework identifies and classifies interrelations between 
reactions and responses to risk and uncertainty. Several decision strategies can of course 
operate simultaneously and any particular strategy may involve a combination of elements. 
Thus the probability aspects of urban flooding may be ignored, but the areas likely to be 
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flooded may be mapped to reduce uncertainties in this respect. Coping with uncertainties 
can occur at the same time as collecting information to reduce them. The framework as in 
Figure 2 should not be seen as ignoring these complexities. 
 
Our research is based on a comparison of three cases (London (Camden); Lisbon; 
Rotterdam), but aiming at some generalizable understanding and focussing in particular on 
the balance between the uncertainties and certainties in each city context. The choice of 
these cases was somewhat pragmatic. However, each city had to be a large EU urban 
agglomeration, with previous experience of pluvial flooding (but not necessarily flash 
flooding), and with the existence of pluvial flood management systems, but with different 
approaches to the problems thereby raised. Local government there had to have a role in 
FRM (to capture local issues), but roles vary per city. English or Dutch data sources 
concerning pluvial FRM decision making needed to be available to make feasible the 
authors’ research.   
 
But investigating decision making under uncertainty is methodologically inherently 
problematic: the state of knowledge and lack thereof may well be hidden or concealed. We 
have to rely on evaluating what decision-makers write, what they achieve in terms of 
outcomes, and talking to people with knowledge of the field. None of this is as 
straightforward as investigating situations where information is plentiful.  
 
Our document analysis covered dozens of mainly government focused sources related to 
flood risk management in our three cities and their national context: directives, guidelines, 
laws, rules, regulations, official strategy publications, policy informing research reports, 
protocols, and scrutiny reports. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in Dutch or 
English, the authors’ native languages (Table 1), and each was recorded and transcribed. 
Interviewees were chosen to cover as far as possible those with interests in flood risk 
reduction decisions (i.e. local civil servants) and their science base (i.e. the researchers in 
Lisbon and Rotterdam). We acknowledge that some data might be subject to differences in 
cultural and linguistic interpretation from interviewees to authors; for example, some 
interviewees in Lisbon were more comfortable speaking in English than others. We sought 
to manage this situation such that when two interviewees were uncomfortable in speaking 
English, their colleagues translated their answers for us. Also for the Lisbon case some 
documents were written in English but relevant passages in Portuguese were translated by 
one of the interviewees.  
 
Information from both documents and interview sources was treated equally and analysed 
following the coding method developed by Miles et al. (2014), identifying and recording 
themes and sub-themes (Table 2). The data was analysed for flood risk measures taken, and 
those planned but not taken; the decision making rationale behind the measures; the 
underlying uncertainties mentioned in the sources. We compared the data and categorised 
it as being related to policy measures, decision making approaches and decision making 
rationales (Table 2). We then scored each city on each of the categories and used the results 
from the scoring exercise to analyse and compare the three cities’ approach to uncertainty 
in flood risk management. 
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4. Urban flooding in London (Camden), Lisbon and Rotterdam  
 
London’s Borough of Camden (LBC)  
Inner city Camden has a varied topography, with some steep slopes centred on Hampstead 
Heath creating five flood water flow pathways to vulnerable areas (Bakewell, 2008). 
Camden Council is the Lead Local Flood Authority, under the national Flood and Water 
Management Act 2010, responsible for local FRM and for implementing SUDS (Sustainable 
Urban Drainage Systems). Camden is also involved in London-wide FRM collaboration, such 
as the North London Strategic Flood Risk Assessment (Bakewell, 2008). The privatised 
Thames Water is responsible for the installation and maintenance of the urban storm 
sewerage network, whilst in the UK the FRM governance system is dominated by general 
oversight by the Environment Agency under the 2010 Flood and Water Management Act, 
working to policies formulated by the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
(e.g. Defra, 2009; 2011), strongly influenced by a cost:benefit imperative derived from the 
UK Treasury’s insistence on best value for money (e.g. Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013).  
Parallel UK policies stress careful spatial planning in flood risk areas, and national/local cost 
sharing. 
 
Flash flooding in Camden from extreme rainfall poses a high to very high risk (LBC, 2003) not 
least because of the Borough’s old drainage system. In 2.5 hours in August 1975 150mm of 
rain fell in a relatively restricted area. The 2002 event was less severe (60mm in less than 
one hour). Both flooded parts of Camden, disrupting public services and causing damage to 
properties, businesses and schools; one person died in 2002 and some citizens had to vacate 
their homes (LBC, 2003). A Scrutiny Panel was set up following the 2002 event, making 
recommendations for further measures (LBC, 2013), the extensive documentation from 
which meant less reliance here on interviews.  
 
Camden’s approaches to uncertainty 
 
Within its five guiding principles for FRM (LBC, 2013: 8), two relate to uncertainty. First, 
gathering further information is central: “Improving the level of knowledge about flood risk 
across all stakeholders is a vital process which needs to be continued” (LBC, 2013c: 9) and 
“Decisions on where local resources are focused should be evidence-based and made 
against clear criteria”. Flood risk maps have been developed, with other north London 
Boroughs, but the two events experienced in the last 40 years are insufficient for estimating 
return periods and adequate risk mapping. Being therefore reliant on flood modelling, 
Camden has developed and relied on new purpose-built models and the science that 
underpins them. But one interviewee commented that, despite much effort, “It has been 
difficult to say with certainty the level of risk in the way we would like … (But) we spent 
quite a lot of time and money … to develop new models and … we (now) feel more 
confident where the flood risk is”. 
 
Secondly, delaying action until targeted knowledge acquisition provides less uncertainty is 
also an adopted approach - although not explicitly mentioned in any policy document. 
Evidence-based decision making selects targets “where local resources are (to be) focused” 
(LBC, 2013: 9): there has to be sufficient certainty about costs, benefits and the effective 
performance of any new measures before decisions can be made. An interviewee reflects 
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on this strategy: “It is very hard to find schemes which (the evidence shows) will protect 
enough properties to make the whole thing worthwhile”. This evidence based approach is 
also reflected in spatial planning policies for new developments, which can only proceed 
after full information is presented about flood risk from the development in the 
neighbourhood and the impact on its drainage system. 
 
Although seeking to create a resilient society is not part of Camden’s formal approach to 
uncertainty, the Borough relies heavily on flood recovery through the near-universal private 
sector based insurance of home owners and companies. Citizens are also encouraged to sign 
up for the Camden Alert Service, giving flood warnings via mobile phones. The Borough is 
postponing the installation of new infrastructure such as permeable roads and enhanced 
drainage capacity until those systems need replacement. This is a money saving no-regret 
approach, and type of decision making, given that infrastructure renewal is a continuous 
urban process. Adaptive management itself has not, however, been formalized. The Greater 
London Authority (GLA) has facilitated learning between Boroughs, and developed pilot 
pluvial FRM projects, such as for implementing community flood plans. In spite of these 
learning mechanisms, there are no high levels of adaptability embedded in decision making 
here. Moreover, the precautionary principle is not apparent in Camden’s approach. On the 
contrary: whilst modelling has progressed, the Council has tended to wait for strong proof 
of harm before implementing measures to manage its flood risk. 
 
Measures coping with or reducing the risk 
 
Faced with the uncertainties inherent in FRM prioritisation, Camden has adopted a risk-
based strategy to address pluvial flood risk, targeting critical at-risk areas. The Borough’s 
second strategy is to encourage the use of SUDS to reduce flood risk (LBC, 2013). Structural 
measures and schemes are being explored but have not yet been implemented. 
 
To tackle flood risk, Camden mainly relies on spatial planning, focusing on curtailing risk 
build-up. All new developments reducing the area of permeable surface require a drainage 
assessment and provide compensation for this loss. Basements can only be developed 
following a drainage and flood assessment and may not be inhabited in the floodable areas. 
Camden has created a hierarchy of SUDS options, with impermeable surfaces and 
infiltration being the preferred option, and direct discharge into a combined sewer the least 
favoured. However, apart from the King’s Cross train station development, no major SUDS 
have been installed.  
 
The Borough’s citizens are only moderately involved, although flood insurance penetration 
rates are relatively high at c. 85% (Surminski et al., 2014). The Environment Agency has 
extensively researched flash flood risk (Environment Agency, 2007) and localised convective 
rainfall events are forecast probabilistically so that decision makers can anticipate flash 
flooding situations. But there is no specific Camden programme to reduce the current risk of 
flash flooding and our interviews showed that many risk communication issues remain. 
 
Lisbon  
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The Portuguese Environment Agency (APA) is responsible for FRM in Portugal, with an 
overview from the National Commission for FRM (CNGRI). Urban flash and pluvial flood risk 
is primarily managed by municipalities - through their Civil Protection Departments – 
together with their responsibilities for urban planning, flood mapping and flood risk 
management plans. National standards have to be met and resources are distributed 
nationally, apparently with some lack of attention to local situations (Pedro Pinto dos Santos 
et al., 2014).  
 
Lisbon is prone to pluvial flooding due to heavy convective rainfall (Fragoso et al., 2010) on a 
city centre that is relatively old, with a drainage system that has blockages creating 
performance uncertainty; serious flood events occurred in 1983, 1997, 2008, 2010 and 
2014. The disastrous flash flooding in 2008 (Fragoso et al., 2010) occurred when 118.4mm 
of rain fell in 24 hours, with an hourly maximum of over 30mm. The event caused four 
deaths and damaged many houses and much infrastructure.  
 
Lisbon’s approaches to uncertainty 
 
Regarding uncertainty, the municipality of Lisbon is undoubtedly aware of the problem of 
pluvial flooding and flash flooding. The uncertainty with flash flooding here mainly lies in the 
limited predictability of any particular up-coming flood event rather than uncertainty about 
the current and future risk of flooding per se. One interviewee reflected: “We have defined 
the problem and we know the critical areas”.  
 
However, all our interviewees felt that Lisbon is not addressing the problem sufficiently, 
particularly regarding flash flooding and urban planning: “We don’t do anything”. However, 
this non-action is not a result of uncertainties surrounding the problem. Rather, political 
differences and inadequate budgets are the constraining factors.  Consequently Lisbon has 
adopted a strategy of knowledge acquisition with regard to key uncertainties. It has long 
experience with creating flood risk maps to increase knowledge and communication about 
critical areas. Information is also sought from informal channels when there is uncertainty 
about a flooding problem or its risk. For example, the Civil Protection Department of the 
municipality (CPD) turns to universities for extra weather forecasts, because the national 
Meteorological Office has not provided adequate hourly precipitation forecasts.  
 
No-regret measures are not an integral part of Lisbon’s approach to uncertainty, although 
one practice may be characterised as such: by planning and restructuring parks upstream of 
the city’s valleys, Lisbon’s Green Plan has a key aim of reducing runoff (Municipality of 
Lisbon, 2010). The invocation of the precautionary principle is also not apparent in Lisbon’s 
management strategies, and there is little evidence of an adaptive management approach, 
although steps are taken to implement a learning system. A Local Emergency Preparedness 
Plan has been initiated in the city centre and best practices will be implemented in other 
areas (Municipality of Lisbon, 2013).  
 
But Lisbon is seeking to rely on a resilient society approach. Uncertainty with regard to 
budgets, politics and the uncertain and sudden nature of flash flooding provide a context for 
developing that approach, so one interviewee commented: “People know [that floods have] 
happened this year and are likely to occur next year. They have put in place their own 
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protection (measures) …. to avoid water coming in”. Local communities, employees and 
children are supported by the CPD to increase their resilience to natural hazards through 
risk communication campaigns and community visits. The private insurance system is also 
seen to contribute to resilience, although participation is voluntary and penetration rates 
are only c. 50% (Surminski et al., 2014). For people to respond well, the weather forecasts 
and flood warnings are communicated deterministically. An interviewee observed: “There is 
a feeling that probabilities are not yet the best way to tell people”.  
 
By joining the United Nations ‘Making Cities Resilient’ campaign, Lisbon has formalised the 
approach of creating a resilient society (Municipality of Lisbon, 2013). However, one 
interviewee was sceptical: “Lisbon is a resilient city within the UN. But when they ask if 
Lisbon is getting ready, we say we have too many other priorities. We have no money. We 
only have ideas”. 
 
Measures coping with or reducing the risk 
 
In terms of pluvial flood measures Lisbon appears to have has no leading strategy or vision 
to underpin its FRM policies; the many uncertainties may assist in retaining this sotto voce 
approach. Its FRM portfolio consists of a combination of understanding risk, warning 
systems and relying on people’s response to flood events. Structural measures to protect 
vulnerable areas against flooding have not been taken up by the municipality, neither is 
FRM integrated with urban planning. Here one interviewee commented that “bad 
management (of spatial planning) increases the risk of flooding”.  
 
Upstream retention basins and ‘greening’ the surface area have been planned, but not yet 
implemented. Moreover, changes to the drainage system are only made when the system is 
malfunctioning, as part of general maintenance. No large-scale restructuring of the 
sewerage and drainage system has been planned (Municipality of Lisbon, 2013). Instead, as 
indicated above, citizens are expected to take responsibility for flood preparedness. A 
system is in place to warn the CPD, who can alert emergency services, businesses and 
citizens. But one civil servant responded that only “more or less half of the population 
knows that we have floods and how to act”. This is despite considerable attention being 
given to informing citizens and businesses at the start of each hydrological year, 
encouraging them to flood-proof their buildings.  
 
Rotterdam  
 
Compared with Camden and Lisbon, Rotterdam is a flat city, without the steep topography 
generating significant flash flooding. However, it is located below sea level, with 
consequences for free drainage. Land subsidence has also created low spots for flood water 
to accumulate (Goedbloed, 2013). Moreover, some waterways have been filled in, reducing 
permeability, water pathways and storage, making the city centre highly susceptible to 
rainfall, although previous flood mitigation arrangements have been replaced by a large 
capacity drainage and pumping system, for which the municipality is responsible 
(Municipality of Rotterdam, 2011). 
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The city experienced pluvial flooding in 1999 and 2001. On 18 August 2001, water flowed 
into basements, offices, shops, roads and tunnels in the city centre (Pieneman and 
Goedbloed, 2014). ‘Flash flooding’ is an unfamiliar term in Dutch terminology, possibly 
owing to the lack of steep slopes in Dutch landscapes, but all future climate scenarios 
predict more extreme rainfall events in the Netherlands, and more such events have been 
observed (Van den Hurk, Siegmund and Klein Tank, 2014). 
 
The Dutch government has set inundation norms for urban flood risk. As defined by National 
Administrative Agreement on Water (2003), urban areas may inundate from a 1:100 year 
pluvial flood, markedly different from much more stringent norms for river and coastal 
flooding (up to 1:10,000 years). Provinces are responsible for the transposition of national 
norms and, for Rotterdam, the Province of South Holland adopted the 1:100 year norm in its 
2009 Water Regulation. But in such urban areas the Municipality is responsible for the 
drainage system and urban planning. Rotterdam is covered by three Water Authorities who 
manage the (main) water system and monitor the spaces for water storage. In practice 
these authorities and the Municipality work closely together in creating water plans, urban 
plans and meeting the inundation norms. 
 
Rotterdam’s approaches to uncertainty 
 
Despite much uncertainty - or perhaps because of it - Rotterdam appears to have a clear 
plan. Gathering information is one of the pillars in Rotterdam used to adapt to climate 
change and to reduce uncertainty (See: De Snoo, 2014; Municipality of Rotterdam, 2013a). 
But gathering more information has not been a rationale for delaying action to reduce 
current pluvial flood risk. Rather, knowledge has accumulated in conjunction with pilot 
projects, with the 1:100 norm as an incentive. Nevertheless, the uncertain return periods of 
extreme rainfall due to climate change has been a justification for postponing further action 
to increase water storage capacity or to implement other measures.  
 
Knowledge acquisition is focused on reducing critical uncertainties in flood risk modelling 
and forecasting. The city and water authorities are continuously monitoring the water 
drainage system to understand its functioning and capacity, helping to improve flood risk 
models. Rotterdam has participated in the RainGain research project, installing radars and 
rain gauging stations with the aim of improving the prediction of pluvial flooding as flow 
gauging cannot yet identify flooding at neighbourhood or street scales. 
 
Advancing knowledge is also part of the city’s adaptive management approach (Municipality 
of Rotterdam, 2013b). The city had adopted the universal norm-driven strategy, aiming to 
create sufficient water storage to protect against a 1:100 year flood, as required by law. But 
the Water Plan of 2007 was revised in 2013 because of new developments and knowledge 
(Municipality of Rotterdam, 2013a): less water storage is needed than initially calculated 
and drainage bottlenecks and hence system performance is now better understood. Instead 
of aiming to reach the 1:100 norm as efficiently as possible, regardless of critical areas that 
more frequently flood, Rotterdam now prioritises areas most in need of increased storage, 
helped by the Dutch government postponing meeting the norm to 2027 (Government of the 
Netherlands, 2011).  
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Another pillar of Rotterdam’s adaptive management is ‘learning’. The adaptation strategy 
sees Rotterdam as “a showcase and laboratory for innovative adaptation strategies” 
(Municipality of Rotterdam, 2013b: 30). An example is the creation of ‘water plazas’ 
intentionally inundated during heavy rainfall events. But there are limits to Rotterdam’s 
adaptability: nearly all measures are engineered and cannot easily be reversed. Responding 
to this acknowledged inflexibility, Rotterdam opted for a phased implementation of 
innovative infrastructure to allow for experimentation, monitoring and learning (Goedbloed, 
2013). 
 
No-regret measures are also important here (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2013b). 
Encouraging companies and residents to install green roofs and replace pavements with 
plants are examples. To improve water storage and drainage, Rotterdam relies on future 
development projects and future replacement of piped and paved infrastructure. The last 
approach uses the precautionary principle, which is invoked for events less extreme than 
1:100 years. The residual risk is captured by a ‘safety net’ of non-structural measures, such 
as a warning system and emergency planning, although flood insurance is very uncommon. 
For future flood risk reduction, the city relies on the same protection norm, but it 
anticipates adjusting this after 2030 (Goedbloed, 2013) 
 
Measures coping with or reducing the risk 
 
Rotterdam aims to become “climate proof” by 2025, and “water proof” by 2030 
(Municipality of Rotterdam, 2013b), with special attention to the expected future increase 
in extreme rainfall events and a reliance on detailed weather forecasts. 
 
In line with traditional Dutch FRM, Rotterdam relies on engineering measures to manage 
pluvial flood risk (Surminski et al., 2014), driven by the legal minimum protection norm, 
measured by the water storage capacity of structural measures. Rotterdam aims to increase 
water storage independent of the existing drainage system, such as in the ‘water plazas’ or 
in underground water storage in densely developed areas without the space for spatial 
planning measures. The Second Water Plan favours outdoor measures integrated in spatial 
planning, such as canals and green areas.  
 
By improving models, from greater attention to their underlying science, the city has now 
identified priority areas vulnerable to lesser than 1:100 year flood events. Additionally, the 
city aims to raise public awareness about citizen responsibility in FRM by incentivising them 
to implement small structural measures, such as the green roofs and increasing garden 
permeability. However, public awareness is low, as one interviewee commented, because 
“the Dutch rely on Government to protect their homes from flooding”. There are no 
measures that particularly address pluvial flood risk, but the warning system was adjusted in 
2004 and 2011, owing partly to poor forecasting of convective rainfall. Communicating with 
probabilistic warnings some days in advance allows for timely preparation for extreme one-
hour precipitation events that can lead to flooding. 
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5. Assessment  
 
Similarities and differences 
 
Our three cities clearly rely on different FRM approaches (Table 3) and each uses a portfolio 
of measures, including structural measures, non-structural measures and insurance 
(excepting Rotterdam regarding insurance). 
 
All three cities seek to advance knowledge – obviously tackling epistemic uncertainty - to 
better understand pluvial and flash flood risk to address their acknowledged uncertainties 
(Table 3); there is no evidence of non-action owing to these uncertainties. But all three have 
pluvial flooding experience, albeit with different intensities, making to ignore or deny the 
risk an improbable decision strategy. Elsewhere it might well be different, such as where 
only model results are available for assessing risk, and there is no significant history of 
flooding. 
 
However, faced with the kind of uncertainties we have described, the decision strategies 
diverge (Table 4). Camden is predominantly focussing on advancing knowledge, with little 
adaptive management. Rotterdam has a multitude of approaches, but leads with adaptive 
management. In contrast, Lisbon has not fully adopted any one approach, tending towards 
seeking to create a more flood-resilient society. However, our results are a snapshot in time. 
So, for example, Camden has been in the midst of formulating and implementing measures 
to address pluvial and flash flood risk; more explicit policies may come with more solid cost-
beneficial FRM measures, or from learning from other cities. Lisbon’s civil servants are 
waiting for a window of opportunity to gain political support and budgets for flood risk 
measures; Rotterdam’s adaptive management may lead to different approaches than those 
initially adopted. 
 
Decision strategies appear to follow a sequence of uncertainty-related steps (Figure 3). 
Camden is at the stage of advancing knowledge, whereas Rotterdam has passed this stage 
and is now at the experimental stage, assessing coping strategies. Other cities will all be 
positioned somewhere on this sequence. However, the sequencing process is not rigid, as 
the case of Lisbon highlights, but can involve moves back and forth over the several steps, 
and may never progress at all. What is achieved may follow ‘fashions’: Rotterdam has 
adopted ‘modern’ measures (e.g. the water plazas), whereas London (Camden) and Lisbon 
are conventional in their approach to decision making under uncertainty, or perhaps are 
further back in the stepped sequence. Probabilistic forecasting is another ‘fashion’, with the 
UK Meteorological Office being a first mover. Moreover, approaches may change if practice 
shows that a strategy deals with uncertainty inadequately because it has a major aleatory 
element that resists its minimisation through knowledge enhancement. 
 
Near certainties 
 
Our interviewees acknowledged that the flood risk problem they faced was not completely 
uncertain and that they worked with certainties too, several of which are susceptible to 
modelling and should be included anyway within any uncertainty analysis. Thus where there 
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are steep slopes, substantial paved areas, reoccurring seasonal drainage blockages, low 
spots where floodwater can accumulate, in a location with intense summer convective 
rainfall, then damaging flash flooding is possible, if not likely (the Lisbon situation). Some 
cities have well defined flow pathways towards one particular low area; Lisbon makes use of 
this knowledge, as implicitly does Rotterdam. 
 
With some history of heavy rainfall causing flooding, the degree of uncertainty again 
diminishes (i.e. Camden; Lisbon). Where the sewerage is dilapidated or inadequate, or with 
blockages, or when that system’s outfall is tide/river level locked, then dangerous flooding 
may be likely: hence Rotterdam’s safety related priorities. The overall condition of the 
system may be well known and one Lisbon interviewee said that autumn blockages are 
more likely owing to leaf fall. In addition, the nearer we get to a flash flooding event (say 1-4 
hours before), the more certain we are about its timing, location and intensity. 
  
Each city relies on the certainty that all infrastructure (roads and drainage systems), has to 
be continually maintained and replaced; delay does not necessarily mean inaction. 
Moreover, the uncertain weather forecasts were perceived by seven Lisbon interviewees as 
a certainty that decision makers have to anticipate, for example by using probabilistic 
forecasting or alternative information sources. The scenario of increased frequency of heavy 
rainfall in the future as a result of climate change is also perceived as a certainty 
(Goedbloed, 2013; LBC, 2013). 
 
Certain other uncertain factors 
 
Our interviewees and policy documents also revealed a number of other factors, 
enumerated below, that influence decision making which may be more decisive 
‘(un)certainty factors’, none of which is currently susceptible to the type of quantification 
based modelling and uncertainty analysis that has become common. This is not to deny the 
importance of such traditional uncertainty analysis, but it cannot cover all uncertainties and 
may well not include those dominating the decision maker. 
 
Firstly, finance is an important certainty or uncertainty at any one time, although episodic 
finance can incentivise experiments with pilot projects, providing learning. Camden has 
refrained from adopting risk reducing measures, because, as one interview commented, the 
cost-benefit analysis result was not approved. In Lisbon, inadequate finance is also a major 
obstacle to implementing FRM measures. In contrast, Rotterdam regularly has budgets for 
adapting to pluvial flooding as an effect of climate change. Additionally, it treats FRM as an 
economic resource: its experimental approach (producing learning) has become a showcase 
for promoting the city and an export earner for Dutch (engineering) companies. 
 
Secondly the legal context can be crucial. Rotterdam has been legally tied to the 1:100 year 
norm, incentivising structural measures; Camden and Lisbon had legal incentives to produce 
flood risk maps, leading to further knowledge generation. Interestingly, no respondent 
judged that the EU Floods Directive had a direct impact by creating legal obligations, but 
had catalysed the consideration of coping measures.  
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Thirdly, politics plays an important role, a finding here that is far from new but which 
remains important. The majority of interviewees felt Lisbon’s mayor did not prioritise flood 
risk and climate change impacts, whereas in Rotterdam the political agenda-setting of 
climate change adaptation facilitated the prioritisation of pluvial flood risk reduction there. 
 
Fourthly, the information we gathered indicated that the cultural context also can 
determine the approach and measures adopted, alongside the many uncertainties. In 
Rotterdam this operated in two ways: the Dutch traditionally rely on engineered 
infrastructure to manage flood risk, and a flood event could harm the reputation of 
Rotterdam and the Netherlands as a flood resistant society, at an economic cost. The UK has 
a culture of flood insurance (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2014), enabling Camden to delay major 
FRM decisions until they are known to be cost-beneficial, relying on home owners to take 
some responsibility for their own protection and recovery. Lastly, Portugal has long 
experience with civil protection from natural hazards, such as earthquakes, forest fires and 
floods. Unsurprisingly its FRM strategy focuses on preparing its citizens for hazards and their 
consequences. 
 
Finally, there is a strong element of path-dependency in urban development that shapes 
decision strategies with regard to pluvial FRM and its uncertainties. The set of possible 
decisions to be made today and in the future is limited by the decisions that have been 
made in the past, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant. Thus virtually 
all major cities have an old centre where the risk of pluvial flooding can be relatively high, 
but where it is difficult and expensive to alter drainage systems or change urban layouts, 
thus limiting the range of feasible risk management options. Rotterdam and Lisbon were 
able to consider some flood risk reduction measures in suburban areas to relieve their city 
centres, but for inner-city Camden this is not an option. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
The risk of flooding in the future is undoubtedly surrounded by uncertainty, and urban 
pluvial floods are perhaps at the centre of this web of uncertainties. Yet decision-makers 
today have to make decisions on the basis of incomplete knowledge.   
 
We believe our ex post analysis, with its combination of document analysis to study the 
written policies of the three cities and interviews to highlight issues and problems in 
decision making, has made a start in illustrating a wider range of uncertainties (and some 
complementary near-certainties) than is foregrounded in the current general understanding 
of and approach to uncertainty in the traditional flood risk management literature. We 
suggest, as a result, that to help flood risk decision making under uncertainty we should also 
seek to address the extended categories of uncertainties which we found in our research in 
our three cities and try to minimise them or perhaps seek to model them more fully in ex 
ante analyses.   
 
Much could be learned, moreover, from further ex post research on other cities, but we can 
see from our three case studies that managing the many uncertainties regarding urban 
flooding is complex, and that many important aspects will never be quantified so model 
development and formalised uncertainty analysis will never be easy or all-encompassing. 
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But, deployed in parallel, ex post analysis as a methodology, as used here, appears to be 
valuable in teasing out some of the reactions and consequent responses to urban flood risk 
and the unquantifiable uncertainties that affect plans and action. We recognise that  such 
analysis needs further exploration, perhaps in further examples in contrasting 
circumstances, to fully understand and unpick these uncertainties, identify certainties and 
near-certainties in so far as each of these affect possible decision strategies.  
 
Notwithstanding this need for further examples, from what we have already seen in our 
three cities there is at least some fair understanding of uncertainty in the urban 
management system (including, we infer from our documentary research, in the public) 
related to flooding. Even without any modelling this understanding can trigger reactions – 
but does not guarantee to do so - which in turn lead to responses and actions to reduce 
flood risk. Some sensible decisions can thereby be made despite much uncertainty, such as 
no-regret strategies and measures implemented in the normal process of periodic urban 
infrastructure replacement and renewal. In this respect learning from other cities will pay 
dividends for those lagging behind, and we see this as related to a city’s position and 
possible movement on the learning continuum we have described. 
 
However progress can be worryingly slow in relation to current and possible future levels of 
risk. This is principally because, first, rapid movement along that continuum unfortunately 
appears unlikely without experiencing actual flood events and, secondly, because in many if 
not most cities key resource constraints rather than uncertainty will often constrain 
decisions on major risk reducing plans and their actual implementation.   
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Table 1 
The interviews: numbers 1-12 face-to-face, telephone or skype; numbers 13-17 by e-mail* 
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Table 2 
Themes and sub themes used in the data analysis 
 
Themes 
Policy measures Decision making approach to risk and 
uncertainty 
Decision making 
rationale 
Sub-Themes 
 
 
Structural measures 
Non-structural measures 
Recovery 
Gathering knowledge 
Non-action: problem is unknown 
Non-action: problem is uncertain 
Delay action to gather further information 
Action based on precautionary principle 
Target knowledge acquisition on critical 
uncertainties to focus action 
No-regret action 
Adaptive management 
Building a resilient society 
Epistemic 
uncertainty 
Cultural 
Legal 
Political 
Path dependency in 
urban development 
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Table 3 
A summary evaluation of measures for coping with pluvial and flash flood risk 
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Table 4 
 A summary and evaluation of approaches to addressing uncertainty regarding pluvial and 
flash flood problems. The dashed boxes indicate the most important decision strategies. 
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Figure 1 
Hall and Solomatine’s (2008) uncertainty analysis framework, predominantly tackling 
quantifiable uncertainties (i.e. the “evidence”, line 2, and the quantifying “functions”, line 3)  
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Figure 2 
 
A simple typology of decision strategies linked to reactions  
and responses to uncertain flood risk management issues 
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Figure 3. 
A schematic of our three cities’ positions in terms of reactions to uncertainty and response to 
their pluvial flood risk. 
 
 
